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We present a two-stage model for the decision making process of nancial
analysts when issuing earnings forecasts. In the rst stage, nancial ana-
lysts perform a fundamental earnings analysis in which they are, potentially,
subject to a behavioral bias. In the second stage analysts can adjust their
earnings forecast in line with their strategic incentives. The paper analyzes
this decision process throughout the forecasting period and explains the
underlying drivers. Using quarterly earnings forecasts, we document that
throughout the entire forecasting period nancial analysts overweight their
private information. At the same time, nancial analysts behave strategi-
cally. They issue initial optimistic forecasts by strategically inating their
forecast. In their last revision, they become pessimistic and strategically
deate their earnings forecast, which creates the possibility of a positive
earnings surprise. This analysis of the dynamics of the decision process pro-
vides empirical evidence on the coexistence of overcondence and strategic
incentives.
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dence, Conicts
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1 Introduction
Studies of nancial markets make assumptions concerning the behavior and de-
cision process of market participants. The e¢ cient market hypothesis postulates
that all market agents are rational and value each security for its fundamental
value or to the extent that some are not rational, the deviations from rational
behavior are random (Schleifer, 2000). To the extent that agents are irrational
systematically, the e¢ cient market hypothesis assumes they are met in the market
by rational arbitrageurs who eliminate any mispricing. Several studies however,
show that arbitrageurs have limited resources in the market and therefore these
systematic deviations from rationality remain present (see e.g. Kahneman and
Riepe, 1998 and Odean, 1998). Among these market participants, nancial ana-
lysts are an important source of information to the stock market in the valuation
of rms (Schipper, 1991). They are often considered to be sophisticated investors,
although they only provide advice, and are therefore an adequate group of market
participants for research (De Bondt and Thaler, 1990). Sell-side analysts assim-
ilate and process publicly available information, acquire private information and
disseminate new information by issuing recommendations and earnings forecasts.
Nevertheless, it is documented that analystsearnings forecasts systematically de-
viate from the rational decision process (De Bondt and Thaler, 1990; Abarbanell,
1991; Brown, 1997; Easterwood and Nutt, 1999) and di¤erent explanations are
put forward for these forecast ine¢ ciencies. Broadly speaking, these systematic
deviations from rationality in the decision making process can be assigned to a
behavioral bias or conicts of interest, which we will refer to as strategic incentives
(Friesen and Weller, 2006).
The literature analyzing analystsdecision process is quite elaborate. Ramnath et
al. (2008) make a thorough literature review on nancial analysts and conclude
that much of the analystsdecision process remains hidden in a black box. Recent
studies analyzing the recommendations and earnings forecasts of nancial analysts
often focus on either the behavioral bias or the strategic bias, or put the behavioral
opposed to the strategic bias, suggesting that only one of them can be present (see
e.g. Chen and Jiang, 2006). Many studies have shown evidence of overcondence
(see e.g. Barber and Odean, 2001 and Hilary and Menzly, 2006) and many re-
search has also provided empirical results on the existence of strategic incentives
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among nancial analysts (see e.g. Dugar and Nathan, 1995 and Ljungqvist et
al., 2007). However, the question whether both coexist in the analysts decision
process has yet to be answered. Therefore, the rst contribution of this paper is
the development of a two stage model for the decision making process of nancial
analysts allowing for the coexistence of a behavioral bias and a strategic bias. In
the rst stage of the model, nancial analysts perform a fundamental analysis in
which they combine public and private information to form their earnings forecast.
During this rst stage, analysts can be subject to a behavioral bias of which they
are unaware. The assimilation of public and private information is modelled as a
Bayesian expectation formation. This processing of information can be subject to
a behavioral bias leading to suboptimal weighting (non-Bayesian) of the relevant
pieces of information. Once the fundamental analysis is complete, a nancial ana-
lyst can, in the second stage, consciously determine whether to deate or inate his
forecast because of strategic reasons. The incorporation of strategic considerations
is modelled as a multiplicative ination or deation of the initial forecast. The
second contribution of this paper is that we use this two-stage model to provide
empirical evidence that behavioral biases and strategic incentives coexist.
The best known behavioral bias is overcondence. In the context of the nancial
market, which is characterized by a high degree of di¢ culty, low predictability and
slow, noisy feedback, this bias is highly relevant (Fischo¤ et al., 1977; Deaux and
Farris, 1977). Specically, it is well known that analysts overestimate the proba-
bility that their personal assessment of the securitys value is more accurate than
the assessment of others (Barber and Odean, 2001). Therefore, when modelling
the nancial analysts decision, we dene, in accordance with Daniel et al. (1998),
an overcondent investor as one who overestimates the precision of his private
information signal.
With respect to the strategic conduct of analysts, the literature provides several
conicts of interest analysts are confronted with. On the one hand, nancial an-
alysts want to provide investors with accurate earnings forecasts. On the other
hand, they are persuaded to please the management of the rms they cover, which
can lead them to strategically change their forecast. When analyzing the strategic
behavior of nancial analysts it is imperative to understand, (i) what it is that
pleases the management of a rm and (ii) why nancial analysts are persuaded
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to strategically alter their earnings forecast estimate. Richardson et al. (2004)
suggest that management wishes to sell stock on favorable terms after an earnings
announcement, but wants beatable earnings targets before an earnings announce-
ment. Since the 1990s rmsmanagement is often compensated by stock options
inducing an increased interest in the stock price among management. In this con-
text, management prefers beatable targets before an earnings announcement. The
reason is that there is an asymmetric response to earnings surprises. Skinner and
Sloan (2002) nd that the average response to negative earnings surprises is signi-
cantly larger in magnitude than the average response to positive earnings surprises.
Bartov et al. (2000) show that rms which manage to beat or meet their earnings
expectations enjoy an average quarterly return that is almost 3% higher. These
empirical ndings suggest that, in order to please management, nancial analysts
should be optimistic just after the earnings announcement, but be pessimistic just
before the next earnings announcement.
As a third contribution to the literature, we perform an analysis of the dynamics
and the underlying drivers of the decision process by investigating the strategic
behavior of analysts throughout the forecasting period. This enables us to test
whether the strategic behavior is in line with the management pleasing behavior
described above. To our knowledge, we are the rst to pursue an in depth analysis
of the decision process over time. We compare the results of our two stage model
applied to the rst quarterly earnings forecasts as well as to the last quarterly
earnings forecast revisions and conrm this pleasing behavior. We provide empiri-
cal evidence that nancial analysts strategically inate their initial forecast at the
beginning of the forecasting period, but deate their forecast in their nal revision
near the end of the forecasting period.
Other studies document why nancial analysts are persuaded to strategically alter
their earnings forecast. First, analysts are inclined to change their forecast, in
order to please management of the stock being covered, because this leads to
investment banking deals for their brokerage house. Financial analysts face a trade-
o¤ between generating revenues for their employers brokerage and investment
banking businesses and their private career concerns (see e.g. Ljungqvist et al.,
2007). Second, nancial analysts are often dependent upon management to obtain
additional information concerning the company (see e.g. Chen and Matsumoto,
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2006). Finally, a nancial analysts compensation is often tied to the trading
commissions earned for their brokerage house (see e.g. Groysberg et al., 2008).
Therefore, nancial analysts are willing to adjust their forecast to raise commission
fees and consequently their compensation.
The majority of existing empirical studies have found systematic analyst optimism
relative to actual earnings outcomes (see for example OBrian, 1988 and Abar-
banell, 1991). In line with these ndings, many studies document incentives which
lead to strategic ination of the forecast. Chen and Matsumoto (2006) nd that
managers provide more information to analysts with more favorable stock rec-
ommendations and Francis and Philbrick (1993) conrm that nancial analysts
report more optimistic earnings forecasts to please the management of the rms
they cover. Dugar and Nathan (1995) show that nancial analysts of brokerage
rms, that provide investment banking services to a company, are optimistic, rela-
tive to other analysts, in their earnings forecasts and investment recommendations.
It is only recently that researchers document systematic analyst forecast pessimism
relative to actual quarterly earnings (see e.g. Brown, 2001 and Matsumoto, 2002).
Several explanations in terms of strategic deation of earnings forecasts have been
put forward. Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007) nd that analysts with con-
icting interests may distort recommendations upwards to trigger small-investor
purchases and to please management, while they may distort earnings forecasts
downwards shortly before the announcement, to allow management to beat the
forecast. Markov and Tan (2006) also indicate that analysts have incentives to
systematically underpredict earnings. When the expected earnings are at a lower
level, they are kept beatable and they ensure a positive earnings surprise when the
actual earnings are reported. If managers prefer beatable earnings forecasts, invest-
ment banking business as well as analystsdependence on management for future
information, can be used to pressure analysts to deate their earnings forecast to
placate management of the rm they cover.
Apart from management pleasing, nancial analysts maximize their compensation
by trying to increase the commission fees. Studies such as Chen and Jiang (2006)
and Groysberg et al. (2008) suggest that analysts exaggerate information to in-
crease trading volume. The increased volume renders higher trading commissions
for the analysts. This exaggeration of information can be translated into both in-
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ation or deation of the earnings forecast. However, Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000)
show that positive news spurs more trading than negative news due to restric-
tions of short-selling. As an extension to the initial analysis, we add the strategic
incentives of investment banking business and commission fees to the empirical
model.
Our empirical results show that, initially, nancial analysts are optimistic and
strategically inate their forecast. When issuing their last revision, however, they
strategically deate their forecast, creating an opportunity for a positive earnings
surprise. For both forecasts, initial and last, nancial analysts appear to be over-
condent. During the entire forecasting period, nancial analysts overweight their
private information. Our analysis of the decision process throughout the forecast-
ing period (dynamics) provides evidence of the coexistence of overcondence and
strategic incentives. The size of the behavioral bias is slightly smaller than the
strategic alteration suggesting that strategic incentives are more economically rel-
evant. The empirical results of the extended model conrm a positive relationship
between a¢ liated analysts and strategic behavior. The empirical ndings of the
extended model are also consistent with Hong, Lim and Stein (2002) showing a
positive relationship between commission fees and strategic ination of the earn-
ings forecast. To summarize, this paper contributes to the literature in three ways.
The rst contribution is the construction of a two stage model which allows for the
coexistence of a behavioral bias and strategic incentives. As a second contribution
the model is tested on a large dataset of earnings forecasts and empirical evidence
is provided on the coexistence of overcondence and strategic incentives. Finally,
we perform the analysis throughout the forecasting period, showing a dynamic
in analystsdecision process and explaining the underlying drivers. We provide
evidence that is consistent with several explanations put forward in the existing
literature.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 elaborates on the
decision making process. Section 3 presents the empirical model and the selected
data. Section 4 discusses some descriptives on the data and section 5 discusses
the estimation results. Next, section 6 provides some robustness checks. Finally,
section 7 concludes.
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2 The Two-Stage Analyst DecisionMakingModel
When studying nancial markets, a set of assumptions about the judgements, pref-
erences and decisions of the participants in nancial markets are needed. These
judgements and decisions pertain to, amongst others, the character of earnings
forecasts (Shefrin, 2008). In this section we introduce a two-stage model for -
nancial analystsdecision making process when making their earnings forecasts.
In the rst stage nancial analysts perform a fundamental analysis in which they
combine both public and private information to come to their earnings forecast.
During this rst analysis, analysts can be inuenced by behavioral biases of which
they themselves are unaware. Once their fundamental analysis is complete, a -
nancial analyst can, in the second stage, consciously determine whether to deate
or inate his forecast because of strategic reasons. The assimilation of public and
private information is modelled as a Bayesian expectation formation, similar to the
model of Chen and Jiang (2006). This processing of information can be subjected
to a behavioral bias leading to suboptimal weighting (non-Bayesian) of the rele-
vant pieces of information. Finally, the incorporation of strategic considerations is
modelled as a multiplicative ination or deation of the initial forecast.
Financial analysts perform an initial analysis in which they combine public and
private information into an earnings forecast. Similar to Gervais and Odean (2001)
and Chen and Jiang (2006), a is dened as the actual announced earnings of a rm,
which follows a di¤use zero-mean normal distribution; c is dened as a statistic for
all public information about a:







with pc the precision of the public signal. Next, let x be the analysts private
information about a :









with px the precision of the analysts private signal. The analysts best conditional
forecast of the actual earnings (a) given its private information (x) and its public
information (c), using Bayesrule, is as follows:
E [a j x; c] = hx+ (1  h) c (3)
where h u px
px+pc
2 [0; 1] is the precision of analysts private signals relative to
public information. When an analyst interprets publicly available information and
weights his private information, he may be unconsciously subject to a behavioral
bias. This could lead him to use a personal weighting scheme, that deviates from
the correct rational scheme, and come up with a rst stage earnings forecast F :
F = kx+ (1  k) c (4)
with k 2 [0; 1] the actual weight the analyst places on his private signal.
In the second stage, after the analyst makes his fundamental assessment of the
companys earnings, strategic incentives might induce him to bias his forecast.
Conicts of interest may persuade the analyst to inate or deate his rst assess-
ment:
f = sF = s [kx+ (1  k)c] = skx+ (s  sk)c (5)
with f the earnings forecast issued by the nancial analyst and observed by the
public. The strategic incentives are modeled by introducing a multiplicative fac-
tor s 2 [0;+1). As analysts are more likely to provide forecasts for stocks for
which their true expectations are favorable and are reluctant to issue unfavorable
investment information (McNichols and OBrian, 1997), it is reasonable to assume
that s 2 [0; +1). With f the analysts expectation about the actual earnings, the
expected forecast error is dened as:






f + (f   c)
Rearranging allows for a clear separation between behavioral and strategic biases
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a¤ecting an analysts forecast and forecast error:











= (f   c) + f (7)
The clear separation is reected in the parameters  and , where  represents the
behavioral bias and  represents the strategic alteration. When  = k h
k
6= 0, then
k 6= h, which indicates irrational (non-Bayesian) expectation formation. When
 = hs h
sk
6= 0, then s 6= 1 and analysts inate or deate their forecast because of
strategic incentives. To determine the order of magnitude of the behavioral bias
and the strategic altering we actually need estimates of k
h
and s. Note that we do
not make any statements about k or h itself. Only the ratio k
h
is identied and for
our purposes it is su¢ cient. Therefore we extract bk
h
from b and bs from b in order
to determine whether the systematic errors in analystsearnings forecasts are at-
tributed to the ine¢ cient processing of information, or due to analystsincentives,
or both.
For a uniform interpretation of s we split up the the data into negative and non-
negative earnings forecasts. To truthfully examine the decisions of analysts, we
wish to maintain those forecasts for which analysts have put in all of their e¤ort.
Hayes (1998) concludes that the incentive to gather information are most intense
for stocks that are anticipated to give strong performance. McNichols and OBrian
(1997) indicate that analysts drop stocks with unfavorable future prospects. To
ensure a sample of forecasts with maximum coverage and processing of informa-
tion, we drop the negative forecasts and only work with zero or positive earnings
forecasts1. Additionally, the behavioral process as well as the incentives can di¤er
for negative and positive forecasts.
We are interested in bk
h
and bs for drawing conclusions on behavioral biases and
strategic incentives. k
h
and s can not be estimated directly. Therefore  and 
from equation 7 have to estimated. Table 1 presents the possible outcomes for b
and b and the implication for bk
h
and bs. When b > 0, then bk
h
> 1 and analysts
overweight their personal information relative to public information. When b < 0,
then bk
h
< 1 and analysts underweight their personal information. When b > 0,
1A sample of only positive forecasts still implies a symmetric loss function of forecast errors.
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then bs > 1 and analysts inate their earnings forecasts. When  < 0, then bs < 1
and analysts deate their earnings forecasts because of strategic incentives.
Table 1: Average FE
This table presents the possible outcomes when equation (7) is
estimated. We are interested in bkh and bs for drawing conclusions
on behavioral biases and strategic incentives. The table presents
the possible outcomes for b and b and the implication for bkh and bs.
> 0 < 0 = 0
b bkh > 1 bkh < 1 bkh = 1
overweight underweight rational weight
b bs > 1 bs < 1 bs = 1
inate deate no alteration
3 The Empirical Model
To test the coexistence of a behavioral bias and strategic incentives, the following
empirical model is used to test equation 7:
FEikt = + Devikt + fikt + iXikt + "ikt (8)
FEikt is the forecast error made by the individual analysts. The forecast error is
calculated as the di¤erence between the analysts forecast and the actual value of
the earnings per share. Devikt is the deviation from the consensus and is deter-
mined as the di¤erence between the analysts forecast and the consensus forecast
concerning the earnings per share. The consensus forecast proxies for available
public information up to that point in time. The consensus forecast at time t is
calculated as the mean of all the analystsestimates up to t, excluding the estimate
of the analyst i, who makes his estimate at time t (analogous to Chen and Jiang,
2006 and Zitzewitz, 2001). fikt is the forecast of analyst i on rm k at time t.
The forecast error, the deviation from consensus as well as the forecast the analyst
makes are deated by the share price. Following Clement (1999), Size of the cov-
ered rm (Sizekt), general (TotExpit) and rm specic experience (FirmExpikt),
two measures of task complexity (FirmComplit and IndComplit) and forecast age
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(Ageikt) are added as control variables (Xikt). A full description of all variables
and their summary statistics can be found in Table 8, in the Appendix. More
information on the estimation technique for equation (8) can be found in Section
5.1.
Analystsquarterly earnings forecasts and stock price data are obtained from the
Institutional Broker Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database, part of Thomson Fi-
nancial. The earnings forecasts cover the period 1996 until 2006. The database
is restricted to highly covered United States companies with a scal year end in
December2. The data set is stripped from errors and potential companies in dif-
culties3. Financial analysts issue earnings forecasts for a certain company in a
certain quarter and, as mentioned earlier, only non negative earnings forecasts are
kept in the data set4.
Financial analysts issue an earnings forecasts for a certain company in a certain
quarter but they can make a revision during this quarter. Pursuing an in depth
analysis of the decision process throughout the forecasting period, we compare rst
forecasts with last revisions. Consequently two data sets are created, one where
only the rst forecast is kept and one where only the last revision is kept. The
First Forecast sample contains 322,123 earnings forecasts, issued by 6,736 analysts
on 2,773 companies. The First Forecast sample contains the rst forecast when
analysts make revisions during the quarter and the sample contains the rst and
only forecasts when analysts make no revisions in the forecasting period5. The
Last Revision sample contains 60,047 earnings forecasts, issued by 4,148 analysts
on 747 companies. The presence of forecast revisions provides a measure of how
closely analysts follow the stock that they cover (Green et al., 2007). Therefore,
2High coverage is ensured by demanding a minimum average coverage of three analysts,
deleting rms which have an average market capitalization below $100 million and deleting
companies for which the average market price is below $5.
3Earnings forecasts released after actual earnings have been reported, are deleted. Observa-
tions of companies, reporting later than 45 days after the last day of the end of the quarter, are
eliminated. It is determined by law that quarterly lings must be led with the SEC within 45
days subsequent to the end of each quarter.
4Deleting negative forecasts implies a reduction of the dataset of 11% from 362,040 to 322,123
quarterly forecasts in the First Forecast sample. Deleting negative forecasts implies a reduction
of the dataset of 12% from 68,270 to 60,047 quarterly forecasts in the Last Revision sample.
5I/B/E/S calls up the majority of the analysts asking whether they want to update their
forecast. An analyst without a revision has consciously chosen to issue and stick to his rst
forecast.
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the di¤erence in sample size suggests that many analysts focus mainly on a few
companies, only issuing revisions for those.
4 Data Descriptives
The majority of past empirical studies nds systematic analyst optimism relative to
actual earnings outcomes (see e.g. OBrian, 1988 and Abarbanell, 1991). It is only
recently that researchers document systematic analyst forecast pessimism relative
to actual quarterly earnings (see e.g. Brown, 2001 and Matsumoto, 2002). Brown
(2001) shows that the mean earnings surprise, which is the di¤erence between the
analysts forecasted earnings and the actual announced earnings, has shifted from
small positive to small negative during the 16 years of 1984 until 1999. Table 2
provides an overview of the average forecast error (FE) over time for the First
Forecast sample as well as for the Last Revision sample. From the First Forecast
sample it becomes clear that average optimism turns into average pessimism after
2002. Turning to the Last Revision sample we notice that the average FE is always
negative, implying that nancial analysts are pessimistic when issuing their nal
revision. The di¤erence between the rst forecast and the last revision makes clear
that nancial analysts are optimistic (less pessimistic) when issuing their initial
forecast but tend to become pessimistic (more pessimistic) when making their nal
revision.
A graphical visualization of Table 2 can be found in Figure 1. The rst forecasts, is-
sued by nancial analysts, clearly show how analysts become less optimistic around
1999 and even pessimistic after 2002. This is in line with economic events such as
the burst of the dot-com bubble and the introduction of new analyst regulation in
2002 as a reaction to a series of accounting scandals. The last revision of nan-
cial analysts follows the same general trend over time as the rst forecasts but is
always negative and lower than the rst forecast. These preliminary descriptives
are in line with ndings from Markov and Tan (2006), who indicate that analysts
have incentives to systematically underpredict earnings. Underpredicted earnings
set beatable targets for rmsmanagement. The positive earnings surprise follow-
ing the earnings announcement has a positive impact on the market price. Also,
the descriptives are consistent with Richardson et. al. (2004), who suggest that
analysts tend to issue optimistic forecasts early and slightly pessimistic forecasts
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Table 2: Average FE
This table presents the average FE (forecast error) for each year
from 1996 until 2006. The average FE is reported for both the First
Forecast sample and the Last Revision sample. The last column
shows the di¤erence between the average FE for the First and Last
forecast.
First Forecast Last Revision Di¤erence
1996 0.0070 -0.0116 0.0186
1997 0.0034 -0.0115 0.0149
1998 0.0188 -0.0108 0.0296
1999 -0.0002 -0.0209 0.0206
2000 0.0004 -0.0221 0.0224
2001 0.0260 -0.0153 0.0413
2002 0.0034 -0.0047 0.0082
2003 -0.0098 -0.0237 0.0139
2004 -0.0149 -0.0283 0.0134
2005 -0.0133 -0.0217 0.0084
2006 -0.0115 -0.0309 0.0194
late in the forecast period.
Figure 1: Average FE of First Forecast and Last Revision
The gure shows the average FE for the First Forecast and the Last Revision
over time. The time period covers 1996 until 2006.


















The descriptives already suggests that nancial analysts are, in some periods of
time more than others, optimistic in their initial forecast. Their last revision, on the
contrary, is systematically pessimistic. These preliminary ndings are consistent
with management pleasing behavior. In the next section, using our empirical
model, we take a closer look at the decision process and analyze the underlying




Both data sets contain nancial analystsearnings forecasts for a particular stock
at a certain point in time. This three way panel possibly contains certain un-
observed e¤ects. Petersen (2008) concludes that OLS with clustered standard
errors (if necessary multiway) is the best estimation method for panel data with
unobserved e¤ects. Following the suggestions of Petersen (2008) and comparing
clustered standard errors, in each dimension or multiple dimensions, with White
(1984) standard errors, we conclude that standard errors clustered by industry are
su¢ cient6. Thomson Financial uses a proprietary classication scheme to catego-
rize companies into homogenous groups according to business lines. Companies are
aggregated at three di¤erent levels: sector, industry and group. Thompson (2006),
as well as Petersen (2008), emphasize that for obtaining unbiased standard errors,
a su¢ cient number of clusters are required. The division into groups results in 211
clusters containing similar business lines. Moreover a rm xed e¤ects estimation
is used. The reason is not only to allow a more e¢ cient estimation of parameters
but also to control for a possible endogeneity issue. Several studies (see e.g. Healy
andWahlen, 1999) document the presence of earnings management in rms. When
a forecast ends up below the actual reported earnings this can be attributed to
earnings management by the rm covered or by strategic deation by the analyst.
A rm xed e¤ects estimation eliminates this endogeneity issue. Consequently, to
estimate equation (8) we use rm xed e¤ects with clustered standard errors by
211 industry groups. The estimation results for regression (8), applied to the First
Forecast sample and the Last Revision Sample, are presented in Table 3.
Concerning the First Forecast sample, the regression results present a positive
signicant b at the 1% signicance level.  is the parameter associated with
the covariate Devikt and can be found in Table 3 on the third row. With b
signicantly higher than zero, it follows from Table 1, that bk
h
> 1. Following
6Standard errors were clustered in one dimension by rm, analyst, quarter and industry. A
time, rm and industry e¤ect could be detected. Afterwards standard errors were clustered in
two dimensions by rm-quarter, industry-quarter and rm-industry. It became clear that the
industry e¤ect was su¢ cient because standard errors did not change by adding an additional
dimension.
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Table 3: Estimation Results
This table presents estimation results for equation (8). The second and third column show the
coe¢ cient estimates and t-values, respectively, using analysts rst earnings forecast. The third
and fourth column represent the coe¢ cient estimates and t-values, respectively, using analystslast
earnings review. For both regressions rm xed e¤ects is used with clustered standard errors by
industry. These clustered standard errors are White (1984) standard errors adjusted to account
for possible correlation within a cluster, i.e. industry. The earnings forecast data is obtained
from I/B/E/S. *,**,*** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Coe¢ cient
estimates are multiplied by 1000 to facilitate readability.
The last two rows of this Table presents estimation results for the weighting factor kh and the strategic
factor s, dened in equation (7). To determine the standard errors of the weighting and strategic
factor the delta method is used. For both factors the two sided hypothesis test of whether they are
signicantly di¤erent from 1 is performed. *,**,*** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
level, respectively.
Explanatory First Forecast Last Revision
Variables Coe¤. t-value Coe¤. t-value
Dev (b) 24.8611 4.17  27.5118 4.29 
f (b) 29.3404 2.13  -47.5030 -3.02 
Age 49.00E 4 3.05  -7.00E 4 -0.28
Size -19.95E 2 -1.83  20.00E 2 1.55
FirmExp -18.00E 4 -0.96 -27.00E 4 -1.70 
TotExp 8.00E 4 0.66 -5.00E 4 -0.45
FirmCompl -7.00E 4 -0.48 -3.00E 4 -0.09
IndCompl -7.00E 4 -0.08 -72.00E 4 -0.36
Adj. R2 0.47% 0.93%
No. Obs. 322,123 60,047
Coe¤. SE tvalue Coe¤. SE t-valuebk
h 1.03 0.0063 4.07
 1.03 0.0068 4.17 bs 1.03 0.0150 2.07  0.95 0.0146 -3.18 
the denition of Daniel et. al. (1998), we interpret this overweighting of the
precision of private information as overcondence. For the First Forecast sample,b is positive signicant as well which means that there is a strategic ination of
the initial forecast.  is the parameter associated with the covariate fikt and can
be found in Table 3 on the fourth row. The regression results partly conrm the
descriptives: nancial analysts are optimistic when issuing their initial forecast.
This optimism stems from overcondence and strategic ination of their forecast.
With regard to the Last Revision sample, both b and b are signicantly di¤erent
from zero. b remains positively signicant indicating the presence of overcon-
dence. Financial analysts remain overcondent about the precision of their private
information. b, however, becomes negatively signicant implying that nancial
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analysts deate their forecast for strategic reasons. O¤ course due to mathemati-
cal construction, the coe¢ cient b on itself cannot reveal anything about the order
of magnitude of the deation. When issuing their nal revision, nancial ana-
lysts remain overcondent but consciously and strategically decide to deate their
forecast.
The construction of the model in equation (7) identies a weighting factor k
h
and
a strategic factor s. Formulating estimates and standard errors on the two factors
allows us to compare the behavioral and strategic bias in magnitude. As  con-
tains both the weighting and strategic factor, a conclusion about the magnitude
of the strategic change cannot be made from  itself. We calculate estimates and
standard errors for k
h
and s. A two sided t-test determines whether the factors
are signicantly di¤erent from one. The weighting factor bk
h
is signicantly larger
than 1 at the 1% level for both the First Forecast and the Last Revision sample.
Financial analysts overweight the precision of their private information by about
3% when issuing their initial forecast and when making their last revision. The
strategic factor bs is signicantly di¤erent from 1 in the First Forecast sample and
the Last Revision sample. However, for the initial forecast we nd an bs larger than
1 while for the last revision this bs is smaller than 1. Financial analysts strategi-
cally inate their initial forecast by 3% while they strategically deate their nal
revision by about 5%.
We conclude that nancial analysts remain overcondent about the precision of
their private information throughout the forecasting period. This is in line with
the assumption of an unconscious behavioral bias. At the same time analysts
behave strategically, in a fashion which is in line with what pleases management
of covered stocks. To maximize their own compensation, often consisting out of
stock options, management of a rm prefers optimistic forecasts after an earnings
announcement and beatable targets just before an earnings announcement. These
empirical results conrm that nancial analysts deliberately inate their initial
forecast while they consciously deate their last revision. Therefore, they spur on
investors, by issuing initial optimistic forecasts, to buy the stock and consequently
driving up the price which is favorable for management of the covered stock. By
issuing pessimistic last revisions they set beatable targets for the management cre-
ating the opportunity to obtain a positive earnings surprise. This positive earnings
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surprise also drives up the stock price after the earnings announcement. The rea-
son why analysts engage in this pleasing behavior can be attributed to two possible
underlying causes. On the one hand nancial analysts bow to investment banking
pressure (Ljungqvist et al., 2007) or the dependence on management for future
information and therefore alter their forecast. On the other hand, management of
covered rms engage in earnings guidance, releasing specic amounts and content
of information and consequently guide nancial analysts to the desired earnings
level. While analysts are overcondent throughout the forecasting period, our em-
pirical results show that the strategic behavior of analysts changes signicantly
throughout the forecasting period.
In the literature of nancial analysts, researchers use the rst (see e.g. Francis and
Philbrick, 1993) or the last (see e.g. Byard and Shaw, 2003) quarterly or annual
earnings forecast, often on a non-motivated basis. Our empirical ndings indicate
that analystsdecision making di¤ers in the rst forecast or the last. The choice of
the rst or last forecast is therefore not innocent. Depending on the purpose of a
study the rst or last forecast might be more appropriate (or both as a robustness).
5.2 Closely Monitored Stocks
Studying the dynamics within the forecasting period implies the comparison of
two data samples who di¤er in size. The First Forecast sample contains 322,123
observations while the Last Revision sample only has 60,047 observations. The
First Forecast sample is much larger because it contains analysts who issue only
one forecast on a certain stock. When taking a closer look at both samples it
becomes clear that the di¤erence in size is due to a signicantly smaller amount of
companies being followed in the Last Revision sample. In the First Forecast sample
analysts cover 2,773 companies while in the Last Revision sample analysts only
cover 747 companies. These di¤erences in sample size indicate that the majority
of analysts follows a limited number of stocks closely, while they keep track of
other companies in a more supercial manner. The closely monitored companies
get initial forecasts and revisions while the other companies only get an initial
forecast.
The presence of forecast revisions provides a measure of how closely analysts follow
the stock that they cover (Green et al., 2007). One could argue that the behav-
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ior towards stocks which are closely monitored could be di¤erent from behavior
towards stocks which are followed only in a supercial manner. Therefore we per-
form a segmentation of the First Forecast sample. Up until now this First Forecast
sample contained the rst forecast of all analysts. Now we divide this group into
the analysts who only issue one forecast during the entire quarter (we refer to this
as the Single Issue sample) and nancial analysts who issue a revision during the
quarter (we refer to this as the First of Revision sample). In the First of Revision
sample we evaluate the rst forecast of the analysts who are also in the Last Re-
vision sample. In addition, this segmentation provides a comparison between the
rst forecast and the last revision under similar sample size conditions. Table 4
shows the estimates of k
h
and s for the Single Issue sample and the First of Revision
sample.
Table 4: Subsamples: Single Issue and First of Revision
This table presents estimation results for the weighting factor kh and the strategic factor s, dened
in equation (7). The estimates of  and  can be found in Table 9, in Appendix. To determine the
standard errors of the weighting and strategic factor the delta method is used. For both factors the
two sided hypothesis test of whether they are signicantly di¤erent from 1 is performed. *,**,***
indicate signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Weighting and Strategic Factor
Single Issue First of Revision
Coe¤. SE t-value Coe¤. SE t-valuebk
h 1.02 0.0064 3.77
 1.02 0.0113 2.15 bs 1.02 0.0162 1.35 1.09 0.0230 3.84 
The results from Table 4 show, for the Single Issue sample, a bk
h
which is signicantly
larger than 1 but an bs which is not signicantly di¤erent from 1. When analysts
follow up on a rm in a supercial manner and issue only one forecast, they are
overcondent but not strategic. For the First of Revision sample, both bk
h
andbs are signicantly larger than 1. The few companies, which are closely followed
by nancial analysts, are the companies for which nancial analysts engage in
strategic behavior. The overweighting of private information in both subsamples
provides additional evidence for overcondence as an unconscious process.
We are aware that the First of Revision sample could be subject to a selection
bias. This sample is constructed based on a post-factum event: a revision at the
end of the quarter is used as a criteria to select analysts at the beginning of the
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quarter. Our main goal is to provide su¢ cient empirical evidence on the coexis-
tence of overcondence and strategic incentives. Therefore we wish to compare the
rst forecast to the last revision under similar sample size conditions. Above we
accomplished similar sample size by looking at the rst forecast of analysts who
issue a revision. To address the problem of a possible selection bias we now draw a
random sample of 60,047 observations from the First Forecast sample. The results
remain consistent with previous ndings: nancial analysts are overcondent and
strategically inate their initial forecast. Estimation results can be found in Table
13 in the Appendix.
5.3 The Extended Model
To further investigate the coexistence and dynamics of overcondence and strate-
gic behavior and the validity of the two-stage model, we add several explanatory
variables to equation (8). So far we illustrate that nancial analysts strategically
inate their rst forecast, but deate their last revision. Earlier research (see e.g.
Dugar and Nathan, 1995 and Ljungqvist, 2007) shows that a¢ liated analysts are
more eager to please management. Therefore we add investment banking business
(IB) as a strategic incentive to the model. We expect these a¢ liated analysts to
inate their initial forecast more severely and deate their last revision more ex-
plicitly. A nancial analyst is perceived as a¢ liated when the brokerage house, he
or she works for, has assisted as underwriter in a public o¤ering of the company,
for which the analyst is following the stock. The window of a¢ liation is ve years
(following Chen and Jiang, 2006), centered around the moment of the registration
with the SEC of the public o¤ering. To determine the a¢ liation of nancial ana-
lysts, all public o¤erings done by US companies with a registration date between
July 1996 and December 2007 are taken into account. The data related to these
o¤erings are obtained from Westlaw Business, part of Thomson Financial.
As mentioned earlier, analysts compensation is often tied to generated trading
commissions. It has been argued that analysts will exaggerate their forecast to
induce more trading and consequently higher trading volumes to maximize their
compensation. Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) show that positive news spurs more
trading than negative news, therefore we expect a positive relation between trad-
ing volume and the strategic component s: nancial analysts concerned with their
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compensation inate their forecast to induce higher trading volumes. Higher com-
missions are easier to obtain when a shift in information occurs for a stock which is
known to have a high trading volume. Trading volume is the average daily number
of shares traded the previous quarter multiplied by the average daily price of the
previous quarter, and will be used to proxy for the commission incentive. Trading
volume data is acquired from CRSP and is expressed in millions of dollars.
Daniel et. al. (1998) show that investors view themselves as more able to value
securities than they actually are. Each investor is overcondent in the sense that
if he receives a signal, he overestimates its precision. Not only this static overcon-
dence has been investigated but also the dynamics of overcondence has been
studied. Gervais and Odean (2001) illustrate how analysts overestimate their abil-
ity after a series of successful forecasts because of a biased learning process. Hilary
and Menzly (2006) conrm the dynamics of overcondence by pointing out that
a previous thriving track record leads to more bold forecasts and consequently to
more forecast errors. In an attempt to not only provide evidence for the static
overcondence but also for the dynamics, we add a track record variable (TR)
dened similarly to the track record variable from Chen and Jiang (2006). TRikt
measures the frequency of the analystsearnings forecast being more accurate than






sign (jFE_Consikjj   jFEikjj) (9)
where Nikt is the number of realized forecasts made by analyst i on rm k up to
time t and FE_Consikj is the forecast error of the consensus, and where sign()
is the sign function dened as:
sign(:) =
8><>:
1 if jFE_Consikjj   jFEikjj > 0
0 if jFE_Consikjj   jFEikjj = 0
 1 if jFE_Consikjj   jFEikjj < 0
Based on previous empirical results (see e.g. Hilary and Menzly, 2006), we expect




Zitzewitz (2001) and Chen and Jiang (2006) provide empirical evidence that low
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ability analysts exaggerate their private information because of reputation con-
cerns. This incentive exists because the market uses information in forecast devi-
ations to form beliefs about an analysts ability. On average, high ability analysts
have viewpoints that are more di¤erent from the consensus. In an attempt to
mimic these high ability analysts, low ability analysts overweight the precision of
their private information. The exaggeration of the news content of their private
information leads to larger forecast deviations, a pattern typical of high ability an-
alysts. Since investors form perceptions about an analysts ability from his track
record (Chen, Francis and Jiang, 2005), the mimicking hypothesis also predicts
a positive relation between overweighting and track records. The overcondence
and mimicking hypothesis di¤er in their prediction about the relation between abil-
ity and overweighting. The overcondence hypothesis predicts no relation, after
controlling for track records, while the mimicking hypothesis predicts a negative
relation once track records are controlled for. To determine the underlying driver
of the overweighting behavior, we add an ability measure to the model. According
to the mimicking hypothesis the less able analysts mimic the high ability analysts
to increase perceived reputation. Michaely and Womack (1999) argue that the
analysts perceived external reputation is one of the major factors determining
an analysts compensation and Stickel (1992) shows that the annual Institutional
Investor All-America Research Teams poll is perhaps the most signicant exter-
nal inuence driving analyst compensation. Therefore, we use the Institutional
Investor All-America Research Team poll as an ability or perceived external repu-
tation measure. We dene a Star dummy based on this yearly prestigious ranking,
published in the October edition of Institutional Investor (see also Hong and Kubic,
2003 and Sorescu and Subrahmanyam, 2006). Financial analysts identied as Star
analysts are assumed to be high ability analysts. The Star dummy equals 1 when
the analyst was elected a star past October and zero otherwise7. The summary
statistics and a description of all added variables can be found in Table 10 in the
Appendix.
7Stickel (1992) shows that nancial analysts, who are elected a star or who will become a
star, perform better than other nancial analysts, who have never been elected or will never
become a star. The star status is awarded in October based on the performance of the previous
year. One could argue to use the year previous to the awarded star status as the ability measure.
Changing the denition of Star does not impact our empirical ndings.
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The extended regression model to be tested looks as follows:
FEikt = + 0Devikt + 1(Devikt  TRikt) + 2(Devikt  Starit) (10)
+0fikt + 1(fikt  IBikt) + 3(fikt  TV olkt) + iXikt + "ikt
The estimation results of equation (10) can be found in Table 11 in Appendix.
Analyzing k
h
and s shows overcondence throughout the forecasting period, strate-
gic ination of rst forecasts and deation of last revisions. To determine how the
weighting factor and the strategic factor evolve for changes in the added covariates,
we perform a ceteris paribus analysis. In the extended model, the weighting factor
k
h








b0 + b1TRikt + b2Starikt (11)
bst = 1 
b0 + b1TRikt + b2Starikt
1 
b0 + b1TRikt + b2Starikt  (b0 + b1IBikt + b2TV olikt)
The weighting factor and the strategic factor are evaluated at specic values of
the added covariates. When, for example, Star changes from 0 to 1, the other
covariates are kept at their mean value.
Figures 2 and 3 depict the, ceteris paribus, impact of TR and Star on the weight-
ing factor and the impact of IB and TV ol on the strategic factor. The values ofbk
h
and bs for each covariate can be found in Table 12 in Appendix. With regards to
the strategic incentives, the relations of IB and Tvol with bs are as predicted by the
literature. A¢ liated analysts are somewhat more optimistic in their rst forecast
and a bit more pessimistic in their last revision, however not signicantly. When
trading volume increases and the possibility for a higher commission fee increases,
nancial analysts become, not signicantly, more optimistic. The results for the
drivers of the overweighting behavior, TR and Star, are inconclusive. We nd no
signicant relation between an analysts track record and overweighting behavior.
In addition, the analysis only shows a signicant negative relation between ability
(Star) and overweighting for the Last Revision sample. Therefore, we dont con-
rm the mimicking hypothesis but neither do we conrm the presence of dynamic
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Figure 2: Weighting factor
This gure shows the changes in the weighting factor for specic values of TR and Star. Star is
evaluated at the values 0 and 1 because it is a dummy variable. TR is evaluated at the minimum,
1st quantile, mean, 3rd quantile and the maximum. When one covariate changes values of the others
are kept at their mean value.
overcondence. We only conrm a static overcondence: each investor is overcon-
dent in the sense that if he receives a signal, he overestimates its precision (Daniel
et al.,1998).
6 Robustness Checks
6.1 Alternative Consensus Measure
When testing our model, expressed in equation (7), the public information is prox-
ied by a consensus measure. In previous results this consensus has been calculated
as the mean of the earnings forecasts, pertaining to the same quarter, previous to
the analystsown forecast. As a robustness check we also calculate the median
consensus and we obtain similar results. Estimation results are reported in Table
14 in the Appendix.
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Figure 3: Strategic factor
This gure shows the changes in the strategic factor for specic values of IB and TV ol. IB is
evaluated at the values 0 and 1 because it is a dummy variable. TV ol is evaluated at the minimum,
1st quantile, mean, 3rd quantile and the maximum. When one covariate changes values of the others
are kept at their mean value.
6.2 Regulatory Impact: 2002
Figure 1 reveals that, after 2002, analysts become pessimistic in their rst forecast.
Even though the last revision is still below the rst forecast, the di¤erence between
them appears to be much smaller. In 2002, after the dot-com bubble burst, it was
clear that nancial analysts were not free from conicts of interest and their recom-
mendations and earnings forecasts far from unbiased. On May 10, 2002 the SEC
approved the NYSE Rules 351 and 472 and the NASD Rule 2711 which imple-
mented basic reforms to pursue the objectivity of the nancial analysts research.
This regulatory change could be a trigger for a change in behavior. Consequently,
we analyze the decision process for two separate time periods: the pre 2002 and
the post 2002 period. The cut o¤ point is the second quarter of the year 2002
because this contains the month of May. The pre period runs from January 1996
until April 2002 and the post period runs from April 2002 until December 2006.
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Table 5: Evaluation Pre and Post 2002
This table presents estimates for the weighting factor kh and the strategic factor s for two periods
of time: pre 2002 and post 2002. The results are presented for both the First Forecast sample and
the Las Revision sample. The estimates of  and  can be found in Table 15, in Appendix. To
determine the standard errors of the overweighting and ination factor the delta method is used.
For both factors the two sided hypothesis test of whether they are signicantly di¤erent from 1 is
performed. *,**,*** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Weighting and Strategic Factor
First Forecast Last Revision
Coe¤. SE t-value Coe¤. SE t-valuebk
h 1.04 0.0114 3.08
 1.03 0.0075 4.45 
PRE 2002 bs 1.06 0.0218 2.59  0.95 0.0133 -3.89 
No. Obs. 154,210 26,607
Coe¤. SE t-value Coe¤. SE t-valuebk
h 1.03 0.0089 2.83
 1.03 0.0085 3.37 
POST 2002 bs 1.02 0.0250 0.72 0.96 0.0278 -1.58
No. Obs. 167,913 33,440
In Table 5 the estimation results for the weighting factor k
h
and the strategic factor
s are shown for both the First Forecast sample and the Last Revision sample, for
both time periods. The empirical results conrm what was to be expected. Before
the new regulation was enforced, analysts strategically inated their rst forecast
and deated their last revision, which is in line with management pleasing behav-
ior. After the 2002 regulation, which tackled conicts of interest, the strategic
behavior becomes insignicant. Overcondence remains in both the pre and post
time periods for both samples. This is additional empirical evidence that the over-
weighting of private information is indeed static overcondence. Each analyst is
overcondent in the sense that if he receives a signal, he overestimates its precision
at any point in time.
7 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, a two-stage model is
developed where behavioral and strategic bias can coexist. Secondly, the model is
tested on a large dataset of quarterly earnings forecasts and the empirical results
conrm the coexistence of overcondence and strategic incentives. Thirdly, this
paper is the rst, as we know of, to empirically investigate the di¤erence in the
decision making process between the rst earnings forecast and the last earnings
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revision of nancial analysts. Descriptive statistics as well as regression results
suggest that nancial analysts issue initial optimistic (less pessimistic) earnings
forecasts. In their last revision, however, they tend to pessimistic (more pessimistic)
earnings forecasts.
We provide empirical evidence on the decision process throughout the forecasting
period. Our empirical ndings show a consistent overweighting of private infor-
mation throughout the forecasting period. A static overcondence is present in
the rst forecast as well as in the last revision. Our results also show a strategic
ination of the forecast just after an earnings announcement followed by a strate-
gic deation of the earnings forecasts just before the next earnings announcement.
Both the initial ination and the nal deation are consistent with management
pleasing theories. An initially inated optimistic forecast stimulates buying behav-
ior among investors, possibly pushing up the stock price and potentially making
it an ideal moment for the management to sell their stock. A deated forecast
just before the announcement date creates beatable targets for management which
can enjoy a higher return on their stock due to a favorable market reaction to
the positive earnings surprise. The conicts of interest nancial analysts are con-
fronted with, are often believed to imply a trade o¤ between management pleasing
or compensational benets and forecast accuracy. Because the benets outweigh
the costs of a less accurate forecast, nancial analysts engage in this management
pleasing behavior. However, earnings forecasts formed under the earnings guidance
of the management are shown to be more accurate (Hutton, 2005). Consequently,
there is no more trade o¤ for the nancial analyst. On the contrary, the nan-
cial analyst seems to please all parties, investors and management, involved. Our
empirical ndings lead to the overall conclusion that overcondence and strategic
incentives coexist in nancial analystsearnings forecasts.
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Table 6: Correlation Matrix First Forecast sample
This table presents the correlation between the variables from equation (8) for the First Forecast
sample. The forecast error, the deviation from consensus and the earnings forecast are deated by
the share price.
FE Dev f Age Size FirmExp TotExp FirmCompl IndCompl
FE 1.00 0.05 0.04 0.02 -0.05 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Dev 1.00 0.41 0.34 -0.06 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.04
f 1.00 -0.02 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.11 -0.03
Age 1.00 -0.04 -0.01 0.03 -0.08 0.07
Size 1.00 0.21 0.09 0.12 -0.10
FirmExp 1.00 0.60 0.17 0.02
TotExp 1.00 0.21 0.12
FirmCompl 1.00 0.12
IndCompl 1.00
Table 7: Correlation Matrix Last Revision sample
This table presents the correlation between the variables from equation (8) for the Last Revision
sample. The forecast error, the deviation from consensus and the earnings forecast are deated by
the share price.
FE Dev f Age Size FirmExp TotExp FirmCompl IndCompl
FE 1.00 0.02 -0.12 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01
Dev 1.00 0.25 0.34 -0.07 0.00 0.01 -0.10 0.02
f 1.00 -0.05 -0.01 0.04 0.05 0.19 0.04
Age 1.00 -0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.10 0.00
Size 1.00 0.17 0.08 -0.01 -0.07
FirmExp 1.00 0.67 0.10 -0.05




Table 8: Summary Statistics
This table presents the summary statistics of the forecast error, the deviation from consensus, the
earnings forecast (deated) and the control variables used in equation (8). Panel A shows the
summary statistics of the First Forecast sample. Panel B shows the summary statistics of the Last
Revision sample. Outliers are removed by deleting the top and bottom 0.1% for the variables forecast
error, deviation and earnings forecast. The earnings forecast data is obtained from I/B/E/S.
Panel A First Forecast Sample
Mean Stdev. Min. Max.
FE 0.30E 5 0.006 -0.254 0.682
Dev 0.005 0.009 -0.112 0.532
f 0.014 0.009 0.000 0.532
Age 73.874 26.127 1.000 143.000
Size 7.930 1.324 -5.319 12.344
FirmExp 11.461 10.363 1.000 59.000
TotExp 20.721 13.390 1.000 59.000
FirmCompl 9.223 5.889 1.000 67.000
IndCompl 1.716 0.937 1.000 9.000
Panel B Last Revision Sample
Mean Stdev. Min. Max.
FE -0.001 0.004 -0.101 0.383
Dev 0.004 0.008 -0.050 0.109
f 0.015 0.010 0.000 0.191
Age 29.299 19.836 1.000 128.000
Size 8.679 1.282 -3.744 12.431
FirmExp 13.086 11.321 1.000 59.000
TotExp 21.086 13.496 1.000 59.000
FirmCompl 4.642 4.157 1.000 32.000
IndCompl 1.175 0.441 1.000 5.000
FE is the di¤erence between the earnings forecast and the actual, deated by the share price. Dev is
the di¤erence between the earnings forecast and the consensus forecast, deated by the share price.
f is the analysts earnings forecast, deated by the share price. Age is the number of days between
the issue of the analysts earnings forecast and the reporting date of the actual earnings. Size is the
logarithm of the market capitalization. FirmExp is the number of quarters an analyst has followed
a certain stock. TotExp is the number of quarters the analyst is present in the data set. For both
ability variables data starting from 1992 is used to prevent all analysts from starting with the same
experience in 1996. FirmCompl is the number of companies an analyst follows during a quarter.
IndCompl is the number of sectors an analyst follows during a quarter. I/B/E/S identies 11
sectors using a proprietary classication scheme for companies with similar business lines.
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Table 9: Estimation Results for Single Issue and First of Revision
This table presents estimation results for the Theoretical Model, expressed in equation (8). The
second and third column show the coe¢ cient estimates and t-values, respectively, for the Single Issue
sample. The third and fourth column represent the coe¢ cient estimates and t-values, respectively,
for the First of Revision sample. For both regressions rm xed e¤ects is used with clustered standard
errors by industry. These clustered standard errors are White (1984) standard errors adjusted to
account for possible correlation within a cluster, i.e. industry. The earnings forecast data is obtained
from I/B/E/S. *,**,*** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Coe¢ cient
estimates are multiplied by 1000 to facilitate readability.
Theoretical Model
Explanatory Single Issue First of Revision
Variables Coe¤. t-value Coe¤. t-value
Dev (b) 26.4177 4.30  23.7026 2.20 
f (b) 20.8574 1.38 79.3088 4.14 
Age 56.00E 4 4.13  -85.00E 4 -1.71 
Size -21.78E 2 -2.03  -26.00E 4 -0.01
FirmExp 1.00E 4 0.05 -97.00E 4 -3.97 
TotExp -2.00E 4 -0.17 52.00E 4 2.46 
FirmCompl -0.01E 4 -0.02 -49.00E 4 -1.29
IndCompl 78.00E 4 0.87 -53.50E 3 -1.74 
No. Obs. 268,842 53,279
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Table 10: Summary Statistics of the First Forecast and Last Revision
Samples: Extended model
This table presents the summary statistics of the variables Track Record, Star, Investment banking
business and Trading volume, used in equation (10). Panel A shows the summary statistics of the
First Forecast sample. Panel B shows the summary statistics of the Last Revision sample. Trading
volume outliers are removed. The earnings forecast data is obtained from I/B/E/S. The security
o¤erings data is retrieved from Westlaw Business, while the trading volume data was obtained from
CRSP.
Panel A First Forecast Sample
Min. Mean Max. Stdev.
TR -1.000 0.312 1.000 0.531
Star 0.000 0.031 1.000 0.174
IB 0.000 0.066 1.000 0.249
TVol 0.974 34.685 178.243 39.249
Panel B Last Revision Sample
Min. Mean Max. Stdev.
TR -1.000 0.238 1.000 0.502
Star 0.000 0.036 1.000 0.186
IB 0.000 0.057 1.000 0.232
TVol 2.995 67.537 273.304 64.885
TR measures the frequency of the analystsearnings forecast being more accurate than the consensus
forecast up until time t for rm k. Star is a dummy variable which equals one when an analyst
has been elected by the Institutional Investor all-American research Teams poll. IB is a dummy
variable which equals one when an analyst is employed by a brokerage house which has assisted
as underwriter in a public o¤ering of the company, for which the analyst is following the stock.
The window of a¢ liation is ve years, centered around the moment of the registration with the
SEC of the public o¤ering. TVol is the average daily number of shares traded the previous quarter
multiplied by the average daily price of the previous quarter.
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Table 11: Estimation Results Extended Model
This table presents estimation results for the Extended Model, expressed in equation (10). The
second and third column show the coe¢ cient estimates and t-values, respectively, using analysts
rst earnings forecast. The third and fourth column represent the coe¢ cient estimates and t-values,
respectively, using analystslast earnings review. For both regressions rm xed e¤ects is used with
clustered standard errors by industry. These clustered standard errors are White (1984) standard
errors adjusted to account for possible correlation within a cluster, i.e. industry. The earnings
forecast data is obtained from I/B/E/S. *,**,*** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively. Coe¢ cient estimates are multiplied by 1000 to facilitate readability.
Extended Model
Explanatory First Forecast Last Revision
Variables Coe¤. t-value Coe¤. t-value
Dev 29.2427 4.08  35.2233 4.78 
DevTR -10.5412 -1.27 -15.6722 -2.04 
DevStar -9.8813 -0.75 -54.5693 -1.74 
f 19.5337 1.28 -56.8933 -2.83 
fIB 5.4582 0.36 -42.23E 2 -0.10
fTVol 31.68E 2 2.05  13.78E 2 1.46
Age 47.00E 4 2.98  -8.00E 4 -0.33
Size -32.39E 2 -2.88  8.52E 2 0.48
FirmExp -20.00E 4 -1.06 -24.00E 4 -1.52 
TotExp 5.00E 4 0.48 -5.00E 4 -0.54
FirmCompl 1.00E 4 0.09 5.00E 4 0.12
IndCompl 27.00E 4 0.30 -24.00E 4 -0.12
Adj. R2 0.52% 1.09%
No. Obs. 322,123 60,047
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Table 12: Weighting and Strategic Factors for the Extended Model
This Table presents the weighting and strategical factors for specic values of the added covariates
TR, Star, IB and TVol from equation (10). This analysis is performed ceteris paribus: when for
example Star changes from 0 to 1, the other covariates are kept at their mean value. The estimates
of kh and s are obtained using equation (11). The standard error are calculated using the delta
method. For all factors the two sided hypothesis test of whether they are signicantly di¤erent from
1 is performed. *,**,*** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Weighting Factor
First Forecast Last Revision
Covariates values bkh SE bkh t-value values bkh SE bkh t-value
TR -1 1.04 0.0146 2.82  -1 1.05 0.0148 3.47 
0 1.03 0.0074 4.01  0 1.03 0.0075 4.60 
0.31 1.03 0.0064 4.14  0.24 1.03 0.0065 4.66 
0.69 1.02 0.0065 3.40  0.56 1.03 0.0063 4.02 
1 1.02 0.0078 2.42  1 1.02 0.0077 2.32 
Star 0 1.03 0.0065 4.07  0 1.03 0.0068 4.80 
1 1.02 0.0122 1.34 1 0.98 0.0113 -1.99 
Strategic Factor
First Forecast Last Revision
Covariates values bs SE(bs) t-value values bs SE(bs) t-value
IB 0 1.03 0.0148 2.19  0 0.95 0.0130 -3.59 
1 1.04 0.0233 1.64  1 0.95 0.0196 -2.41 
TV ol 0.97 1.02 0.0164 1.29 2.99 0.94 0.0140 -3.92 
6.77 1.02 0.0160 1.44 18.62 0.95 0.0132 -4.01 
34.69 1.03 0.0149 2.19  67.54 0.95 0.0131 -3.58 
48.03 1.03 0.0149 2.51  97.09 0.96 0.0147 -2.91
178.24 1.03 0.0293 2.91  273.30 0.98 0.0371 -0.52
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Table 13: Random Draw from First Forecast Sample
This table presents estimation results for the Theoretical Model, expressed in equation (8). The
second and third column show the coe¢ cient estimates and t-values, respectively, using analysts
rst earnings forecast. The sample used contains 60,047 observations, randomly drawn from the
First Forecast sample of 322,123 observations. Firm xed e¤ects is used with clustered standard
errors by industry. These clustered standard errors are White (1984) standard errors adjusted to
account for possible correlation within a cluster, i.e. industry. The earnings forecast data is obtained
from I/B/E/S. *,**,*** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Coe¢ cient
estimates are multiplied by 1000 to facilitate readability.
The last two rows of this Table presents estimation results for the weighting factor kh and the strategic
factor s, dened in equation (7). To determine the standard errors of the weighting and strategic
factor the delta method is used. For both factors the two sided hypothesis test of whether they are




Dev (b) 26.8406 2.61 









h 1.03 0.0109 2.54
bs 1.03 0.0160 2.01 
37
Table 14: Estimation Results with Median Consensus
This table presents estimation results for the Theoretical Model, expressed in equation (8). Public
information is proxied by the median consensus. The second and third column show the coe¢ cient
estimates and t-values, respectively, using analystsrst earnings forecast. The third and fourth
column represent the coe¢ cient estimates and t-values, respectively, using analysts last earnings
review. For both regressions rm xed e¤ects is used with clustered standard errors by industry.
These clustered standard errors are White (1984) standard errors adjusted to account for possible
correlation within a cluster, i.e. industry. The earnings forecast data is obtained from I/B/E/S.
*,**,*** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Coe¢ cient estimates are
multiplied by 1000 to facilitate readability.
The last two rows of this Table presents estimation results for the weighting factor kh and the strategic
factor s, dened in equation (7). To determine the standard errors of the weighting and strategic
factor the delta method is used. For both factors the two sided hypothesis test of whether they are
signicantly di¤erent from 1 is performed. *,**,*** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
level, respectively.
Theoretical Model
Explanatory First Forecast Last Revision
Variables Coe¤. t-value Coe¤. t-value
Dev (b) 23.7222 3.99  28.1123 4.35 
f (b) 29.9351 2.18  -47.5742 -3.03 
Age 50.00E 4 3.07  -8.00E 4 -0.31
Size -19.97E 2 -1.83  20.12E 2 1.56
FirmExp -17.00E 4 -0.95 -27.00E 4 -1.69 
TotExp 8.00E 4 0.66 -5.00E 4 -0.46
FirmCompl -8.00E 4 -0.49 -3.00E 4 -0.08
IndCompl -6.00E 4 -0.07 -72.00E 4 -0.36
No. Obs. 322,121 60,046
Coe¤. SE t-value Coe¤. SE t-valuebk
h 1.02 0.0062 3.89
 1.03 0.0068 4.22 bs 1.03 0.0149 2.12  0.95 0.0147 -3.18 
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Table 15: Estimation Results Pre and Post 2002
This Table presents the estimated coe¢ cients of Dev and f from equation (8). Estimation results
are shown for both the First Forecast sample and the Last Revision sample. Results are presented
separately for two periods of time. The pre 2002 and the post 2002 period. The cut o¤ point is the
second quarter of the year 2002. The pre period runs from January 1996 until April 2002 and the
post period runs from April 2002 until December 2006. For all four regressions rm xed e¤ects is
used with clustered standard errors by industry. These clustered standard errors are White (1984)
standard errors adjusted to account for possible correlation within a cluster, i.e. industry. The
earnings forecast data is obtained from I/B/E/S. *,**,*** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5% and
1% level, respectively. Coe¢ cient estimates are multiplied by 1000 and control variables are not
reported to facilitate readability.
Explanatory First Forecast Last Revision
Variables Coe¤. t-value Coe¤. t-value
Dev 33.8926 3.18  32.2635 4.60 
PRE 2002 f 51.6416 2.73  -52.9513 -3.72 
ControlVar. not reported not reported
Dev 24.4982 2.90  27.95 3.47 
POST 2002 f 17.3470 0.74 44.65 -1.51
ControlVar. not reported not reported
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